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Border Institutions - What Is Lacking in the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands Dispute
Dexin Tian, SCAD-Savannah, USA
Chin-Chung Chao, University of Nebraska at Omaha, USA
Abstract: This study explores the interactions among the claimants for the sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute with the intention to find out what is lacking in their communication for a genuinely peaceful
and mutually beneficial solution to the multilateral international conflict. Guided by the theory of border institutions
and via the research methods of hermeneutics, we found that the US, though not a claimant, appears officially
neutral but actually pro-Japan in the conflict, though deeply involved in the dispute, purposely remains on the
sidelines. As claimants, Japan, China and Taiwan all insist on their own claims based on supporting evidence from
various perspectives so strongly that they leave no room for negotiations. Nevertheless, the study reveals that a
peaceful and collaborative resolution to this complex dispute can only result from genuine dialogues for appreciating,
reconstructing, and maintaining border institutions, possibly under the influence or leadership of the US. [China
Media Research. 2013; 9(4): 27-44]
Keywords: Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; border institutions; peaceful and collaborative resolution
Lying in the East China Sea, an island group
consisting of five uninhabited islands and three rocks
(known as the Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and
Diaoyutai in Taiwan) has been causing waves of
sensation of the whole world. For instance, Kristof
(2010) asked the global audience to stay tuned because
“this is a boundary dispute that could get ugly and some
day have far-reaching consequences for China, Japan,
Taiwan and the United States” (p. 1). Most recently,
Harner (2013) began his blog article in the online
Forbes magazine with “second only to nuclear weapon
development on North Korea and Iran, it is the most
dangerous potential casus belli [sic] in the world today,
and it is likely to remain so indefinitely” (p. 2). Thus,
we can clearly sense the intensity and severity of the
conflict under discussion.
On the one hand, Japan declares full sovereignty
and rejects any territorial dispute over these islands
arguing that it discovered the islands terra nullius or
land of no human beings and incorporated them into
Japan as a cabinet decision in 1895 and exercised
effective control over the islands with no Chinese
protest until 1971. On the other, both Mainland China
and Taiwan claim that China, not Japan, discovered and
exercised sovereignty over the islands since the 14 th
century, and Japan seized them from Taiwan under
Article Two of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 after
Japan won the first Sino-Japanese War from1894
to1895.
Although disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands
have been recurring for many decades, what flared up
the most recent conflict involving Japan, China, Taiwan,
and the US is Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s
proposal of purchasing these islands by the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government in April 2012 and the
subsequent nationalization of three of the islands by the
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Japanese government in September 2012. For months,
China has been regularly sending out surveillance ships
and planes towards the disputed areas. To confront the
aggressive Chinese patrol missions each time, war ships
of Japanese Coast Guards and jet fighters from the
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would come to
intercept the approaching Chinese ships and planes. The
non-compromise positions of the two governments have
not only put their bilateral relationship into a stand-off
but also filled the whole world with increasing worries
about unexpected face-off or more catastrophic
consequences.
To complicate the conflict, Liang Ying-ping,
Taiwan’s top representative to Seoul, South Korea
announced to the media: “Our stance is clear. The
Diaoyutai Islands are the territory of the Republic of
China (ROC). The dispute is a three-party concern, not
just confined to Japan and China” (Kim, 2012, p. 1).
Just as President Ma Ying-jiou of Taiwan remarked,
“we will not make any concessions on national
sovereignty…. There could be more serious
confrontations or wars if we do not resolve the dispute
peacefully” (Mo, 2012, p. 7). President Ma called for a
trilateral dialogue between Taiwan, Japan and China to
resolve the sovereignty dispute. In fact, there is also a
fourth party, the US, which has been directly and
indirectly involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute.
From the above, we can see that there are actually
two sides of four parties deeply involved in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute: Japan and the US as
the accused on the defensive side; China and Taiwan as
the accusers on the challenging side. This does not mean
that there are no conflicts between Japan and the US and
China and Taiwan. However, for the purpose of this
study and based on the existing literature, we just focus
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on exploring what is lacking in the available interactions
between the two sides and among the four parties in this
multi-lateral international conflict.

At least, how the dispute will be resolved will
definitely affect the Asia-Pacific region directly and
indirectly. The Asia-Pacific region, which covers 70%
of the earth’s surface and 50% of the world’s ocean
surface, provides many export-oriented economies
around the Pacific Rim with the most dynamic and
strategic trade routes and energy resources. As a “key
engine for the global economy” (VOC, 2013, p. 1), the
region has half of the world’s population, with a
combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $39 trillion,
accounting for 56% of the world economic output. The
region is home to quite a number of the world’s largest
militaries and the majority of the world’s nuclear power.
Therefore, in his remarks to the Australian
Parliament, President Obama (2011) predicted that this
region will “largely determine whether the century ahead
will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless
suffering or human progress” (p. 15). In her article
entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” Secretary Clinton
(2011) emphasized a smart and systematic US effort over
the next decade by “locking in a substantially increased
investmentdiplomatic, economic, strategic, and
otherwisein the Asia-Pacific region” (p. 1). It is clear
that the year 2011 became a pivot point for the United
States to complete its withdrawal of soldiers from Iraq
and Afghanistan and began reasserting itself in the AsiaPacific region. Although the reassertion of the AsiaPacific region is a continuation of the US policies
undertaken by previous administrations, the Obama
Administration intends to achieve some larger purposes
and make the US “play a larger and long-term role in
shaping this region and its future, by upholding core
principles and in close partnership with our allies and
friends” (Obama, 2011, p. 16).

Literature Review
The backdrop and influence of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute. The Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands
are located northeast of Taiwan, east of China, and
southwest of Okinawa, the southern-most prefecture of
Japan. In his Congressional Research Service Report,
Manyin (2013) reported, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
consist of five islets and three rocky outcroppings with a
total landmass of less than seven square kilometers or
three square miles. The largest island is about two miles
in length and less than one mile in width. None of the
islands are inhabited and unlikely to support any human
life or economic activities from indigenous resources.
Despite the unfavorable natural features, Japan, China,
and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over the islands.
Periodic tensions and conflicts have been occurring
among the claimants and, fueled by rising nationalism
in all parties, waves of nation-wide campaigns have
been witnessed, all claiming the sovereignty over theses
islands due to their strategic significance in terms of
economy, security, and political implications.
Economically, sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands could “convey exclusive economic
rights to nearly 20,000 square nautical miles of undersea
resources” (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008, pp. 903-904). It
means that control of the islands would confer
ownership of natural resources such as fishery and
potential oil and gas reserves in their vicinity. In terms
of security, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands lie close to key
shipping lanes in the region. As Pan (2007) said, the
location of the islands on the eastern edge of the
continental margin in the East China Sea exerts strategic
impact upon “both China and Japan’s increasingly
voracious appetite for energy, natural resources, and
extension into the high seas” (p. 72) and the sovereignty
over the islands “can be a factor that significantly
influences the location of a maritime boundary between
China and Japan” (p. 84). This is why Suganuma (2000)
remarked: “If there is a flash point to ignite a third SinoJapanese War, it will be the ownership of the Diaoyu
Islands in the East China Sea” (p. 151). Finally, since
both China and Japan have maritime territorial disputes
with their neighboring countries, both have been making
the greatest efforts avoiding any potential negative
domino effect in the handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands dispute. Just as Koo (2009) noted, any
concessions in the dispute “could possibly jeopardize
their respective claims to the other disputed islands” (p.
206). Thus, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is not
just territorial. It bears more chain-effect significance in
politics, economics, and national, even international
security.
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Scholarship on territorial conflict. Among all
kinds of conflict, territorial conflict is next to none in its
frequency, severity, and consequences. Holsti (1991)
noted, among interstate wars between 1648 and1989,
“territorial issues were by far the most important single
issue category” (p. 307). Vasquez (1995) found, “a
minimum of 79% of wars were fought over territoryrelated issues in five historical periods from 1648 to
1990” (p. 284). Hensel (2000) also found that, between
1816 and 1992, more than half of the wars were related
to issues of disputed territory, and disputes over
territory tended to result in conflicts with much more
fatalities than disputes of other categories. Gleditsch
(1998) provided reasons for the territorial conflict by
saying, “the territory itself might be seen as important to
the identity of a people and the symbolic function might
be more important than any material value” (p. 385).
Similarly, Knight (1982) remarked, “territory is not; it
becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human
beliefs and actions that give territory meaning” (p. 517).
Murphy (1990) also stressed, as a social construct,
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“territory is fundamentally embedded in social
processes,” which is “at the heart of national identity
and cohesion and of supreme importance to the state” (p.
531).
To comprehend international disputes or conflicts,
there are two main camps of scholars. While liberals
argue that territorial disputes lose their salience as a
result of increasing economic interdependence, realists
counter-argue that economic interdependence not only
fails to promote peace but also increases conflicts due to
asymmetric dependence and inequality between
economic partners. Nevertheless, Simmons (2005)
found, while scholars of realist thought regard territory
as the object of zero-sum state competition for power,
prestige, or an imagined national identity, liberal
scholars of globalization stress that in this increasingly
borderless world, human capital matters more than
territorial matters and national power. In reality, less
than one third of the international borders have been
disputed since World War II. Even in the Middle East,
80% of the borders remain peaceful through mutually
accepted formal treaties. Take China for example, it has
settled 17 of its 23 territorial disputes since 1949.
Moreover, China has made substantial compromises in
most of these settlements, “usually receiving less than
50% of the contested land” (Fravel, 2005, p. 46). In
contrast, it is also argued, “national boundaries continue
to have significant influences on international economic
relations” (Simmons, 2005, p. 826). An empirical study
of bilateral trade between the US and Canada revealed
that “trade between Canadian provinces was 22 times
that of Canada-US trade, all other factors being held
equal” (McCallum, 1995, p. 617).
As a summary, Mowle (2003) commented, realism
and liberalism “are as much quality as they are of action.
A comparison of the two approaches must somehow pry
open the intent behind the action” (p. 562). It means that
there must be a shift of the analysis from the state to the
individuals within the state who make decisive
decisions and implement purposive actions. Chiozza
and Choi (2003) concurred with Mowle in their
empirical study, “leaders, who have the political interest
and ability to lead their countries onto a different road,
do matter in explaining decisions to settle territorial
disputes” (p. 275). Thus, territorial disputes may lead to
military confrontations, but wise leadership guided by
domestic needs and international norms may set the
interactions between or among claimants and bilateral
or trilateral relationships onto peaceful paths.
Literauture on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute. Existing literature concerning the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute falls into three major categories.
The first category of literature explains the continuity
and escalation of the dispute. Scholars (e.g., Bush III,
2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010;
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Kenny, 2004; Park, 1973; Valencia, 2000) predicted that
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute would continue and
escalate so long historical and legal issues among the
claimants remain unresolved and the dispute involves
material and symbolic significance. For example, Bush
III (2010) predicted, “there was a danger that the dispute
might become militarized,” (p. 6) as strategists in both
Japan and China “cited with concern the old Chinese
expression, ‘two tigers cannot coexist on the same
mountain’” (p. 8). However, all the flare-ups over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have been eventually calmed
down.
The second category of literature provides
explanations for the mutual restraint from all parties
involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Some
scholars (e.g., Blanchard, 2000; Bush III, 2010; Fravel,
2010; Ito, 2008; Hara, 2001; Lind, 2004) remarked, due
to the US factor, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was taking place within certain
limits. For example, Blanchard (2000) noted, “it [the US]
currently has the authority, at a minimum, to press both
sides to explicate their real interests and to promote
alternatives for a settlement of the controversy” (p. 121).
Fravel (2010) seconded, “the United States is an
important actor in the China-Japan disputes, especially
the conflict over the Senkaku Islands” (p. 144). Some
other scholars (e.g., Christensen, 2006; Friedberg, 2005;
Goldstein, 2005; Niksch, 1996; Wiegand, 2009) showed
their worries that a more capable China might become a
nascent China threat. Wiegand (2009) claimed, as the
second largest consumer of oil after the US, China
“continues to claim sovereignty over the islands and the
dispute is nowhere close to being resolved” (p. 170).
Nevertheless, it has been found that China has been
cooperative and peaceful in its territorial disputes since
1949 (Fravel, 2005, 2008, 2010; Nie, 2009).
The final category of literature accounts for the
repeated ups and downs in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute. On the one hand, many scholars (e.g., Chung,
2004; Fravel 2005; HagstrÖm, 2005; Pan, 2007)
associated the ups and downs of the dispute with the
desires and power struggles of the state elites among
all sides of the claimants in their domestic decisionmaking processes. Pan (2007) remarked that the
handling of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute “is seen
as a factor impacting on the legitimacy of Chinese and
Japanese central governments in domestic politics and
on their foreign relations in the international arena” (p.
72). Meanwhile, many other scholars (e.g., Blanchard,
2000; Fravel, 2010; Koo, 2009; Manyin, 2013; Tanaka,
2010) emphasized the international nature of the
dispute, especially the US factor. Blanchard (2000)
noted, the US “has been deeply involved” in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and it “should
become more actively involved in trying to encourage
a resolution of the dispute, or at a minimum, serious
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discussion between the Chinese and the Japanese” (p.
121).
It can be seen from the above that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is not simply a conflict
between Japan/US and China/Taiwan, it is a
complicated and multi-sided conflict of international
nature. So far, much ink has been spilled about the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute from various
perspectives as described, little has been done from the
perspective of communication in terms of
argumentation. We attempt to fill this void by exploring
how the involved parties have been communicating to
the public to seek answers to the following three
research questions:
RQ1: What are the conflicting points in the
claimants’ claims?
RQ2: What are the pieces of supporting evidence
and counterevidence?
RQ3: What is lacking for a genuinely peaceful and
win-win solution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute?
The research findings of this study are expected to
enrich the existing body of literature on conflict
communication in general and the dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea in
particular while shedding light on similar disputes over
islands in the South China Sea at the same time.
Theoretical Framework of Institutions
The application of international borders as
institutions “neither falls prey to claims that borders do
not matter nor is prisoner to realism’s zero-sum
assumptions” (Simmons, 2005, p. 827). Simmons is a
Harvard scholar of international affairs, and he defined
institutions as “sets of rules, compliance procedures,
and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to
constrain behavior” (p. 827). Giordano, Giordano, and
Wolf (2005) specified that, in the international resource
arena, “institutions range from customary practices
among neighboring states to multilateral resource
conventions and treaties” (p. 53). As a summary,
Slaughter (1995) clarified, the theory of institutions
posits that rules, norms, and decision-making
procedures define international regimes, which reduce
transaction costs consistent with regime principles
through cooperation. Simultaneously, they facilitate
connections within and between regimes over issues by
creating conditions for orderly, multilateral negotiations.
Amenta and Ramsey (2010) noted further that there
are three types of theoretical claims in institutions:
sociological, historical, and political. The first holds that
cultural and ideational causes in a society exert
influence on the state policies. Focusing on macropolitical or macro-economic determinants, the second
asks big questions and highlights the importance of
institutions. The third argues that the process of
formation of states, political systems, and political party
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systems have strong impact upon political processes and
outcomes. Nie (2009) specified two major forms of
institutional explanations over territorial disputes. The
first argues that “border territories are extraordinary
spaces embodying a defined legal order within
international relations,” therefore; “border issues
influence the attitudes of policymakers” (p. 491). JeanMarc Blanchard and Paul K. Huth are representative
scholars here, and they predict democratic countries
tend towards peaceful means, and non-democratic states
towards non-peaceful means of resolving territorial
issues. The second emphasizes: “International
institutions are an important guarantee of conflict
prevention” (Nie, 2009, p. 492). Stephen A. Kocs and
Mark W. Zacher are representatives in this regard. To
them, without clear and legally demarcated boundaries,
wars will probably break out between involved states.
Furthermore, Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf (2005)
summarized three causes for potential territorial
conflicts and four conditions for successful institutions.
The most likely locations for territorial conflicts are
“those in which (1) institutional development is
hindered; (2) previously functioning institutions
collapse; or (3) change in resource conditions outpace
the ability for institutional adaptation” (p. 48). Critical
factors for long-term institutional success include: (1)
clear language concerning resource allocation and
quality control; (2) high degree of institutional
adaptability; (3) allocating benefits considered more
productive than allocating the resource; and (4) clearly
defined conflict resolution mechanism in place.
Research Method
For the purpose of this study, we collected our
primary data from relevant wartime declarations1,
bilateral treaties2, government statements3, and dozens
of news briefs from the governments of the above three
governments plus the government of the US. The
supporting evidence and counterevidence of the
claimants’ claims are composed of historical records of
Chinese missions and official decrees during the Ming
and Qing dynasties and Japanese survey and Cabinet
decision to annex the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; letters
between the Chinese and Japanese and among the
Japanese, relevant maps of Japan, China, and the US,
and experts’ interview transcripts with Professor
Susumu Yabuki and Kurt Campbell, former assistant
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.
Besides, we made a purposive selection of artifacts in
terms of the relevant media reports and readers’ online
responses concerning the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute, from both the LexisNexis news database and
Google News website. In total, we have printed over
100 pages of singled-lined news reports. For the
discussion about the role of the US in the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute, we focused on the online Forbes

editor@chinamediaresearch.net

China Media Research, 9(4), 2013, Tian & Chao, What Is Lacking in Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute
Magazine blog article entitled “The U.S. Could Have
Prevented the Senkaku/Diaoyu Crisis. Why Did It Not?”
in February 2011 by Stephen Harner, who has worked
in both Japan and China for dozens of years, and the 60some responses to his blog.
For data analysis, we adopted hermeneutics to
interpret the interactions in the above-mentioned
communication artifacts of Japan, China, Taiwan and
the US. Byrne (2001) explained, hermeneutics is usually
used for the interpretation and understanding of texts
derived
from
stories,
interviews,
participant
observations, letters, speeches, or other relevant written
documents and personal experiences. Girish (2008)
further clarified, as an art of interpreting, hermeneutics
developed into a theory of human understanding
through the works of Scheleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heideggar, Gadamar, and Derrida. The essence
of hermeneutics is that “the concealed import of a text
cannot be understood without uncovering the historical
contact and the sociocultural milieu of the community
on which it is based” (p. 2). This means that, to
thoroughly and appropriately analyze a text, it is
essential to understand the origin of the text along with
its historical and cultural background. To this end, the
texts are usually closely examined in connection to their
relevant historical and socio-cultural contexts for the
generation of themes or patterns as research findings,
which reflect the knowledge of the phenomenon under
study.

the Senkaku Islands (The Basic View)” and “Q&A on
the Senkaku Islands” (Q&A) by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) of Japan, the Japanese government
began a series of thorough surveys of the Senkaku
Islands from 1885, which proved the islands
uninhabited. Then, a Cabinet Decision (Appendix 1)
was made on Jan. 14, 1895, and the islands were
incorporated into Japan as terra nullius with markers
erected (Fact Sheet of MOFA, 2012, para. 9).
Even during the US administration of the islands, the
US Navy “established firing ranges on the islets and paid
an annual rent of $11,000 to Zenji Koga, the son of the
first Japanese settlers of the islets” (Manyin, 2013, p. 4).
A copy of the lease contract is provided in Appendix 2.
Besides, the Japanese government also lists the following
as examples of valid control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands: (1) Patrol and law enforcement; (2) Levying
taxes on the owners of the islands; (3) Management as
state-owned land; (4) Implementing researches for
utilization and development (Q&A, p. 4).
However, the Chinese side counter-argued that
when the Japanese Cabinet decided to annex the islands
to the territory of Japan in 1985, Japan was fully aware
that “the islands have already been well-known to Qing
envoy ships dispatched to crown the former Zhongshan
King and already given fixed Chinese names and used
as navigation aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands”
(MOFA of Japan, 1950). The citation is from a report of
the Magistrate of Okinawa, Nishimura Sutezo to the
Japanese Home Secretary Yamagata Aritomo on
September 22, 1885. In less than a month on October 21,
1885, the Japanese Foreign Minister announced: “Most
recently Chinese newspapers have been reporting
rumors of our government’s intention of occupying
certain islands owned by China located next to Taiwan,”
and he warned, “the investigations of the abovementioned islands should not be published in the
Official Gazette or newspaper. Please pay attention to
this” (MOFA of Japan, 1950).
In its “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of P.R. China” (Statement) on Sept. 10, 2012 and
“Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China” White
Paper (White Paper) on Sept. 28, 2012 by the State
Council Information Office of P.R. China, the Chinese
government held that it was China, instead of Japan,
that discovered and peacefully used the Diaoyu Islands
since its Ming Dynasty in the 14th century. According to
the White Paper, 24 mission voyages were made from
China to the Ryukyu Kingdom, a tributary nation of
China, from 1732 to 1866. There were ample records
from these voyages about the Diaoyu Islands. Envoy
Chen Kan from the Ming Court recorded in the Envoys
to Ryukyu in 1534, “the ship has passed Diaoyu Dao,
Huangmao Yu, Chi Yu…. Then, Gumi Mountain comes
into sight, which is where the land of Ryukyu begins”
(White Paper, 2012, p. 3). For another example, to

Research Findings and Critical Analysis
As mentioned earlier, there are two sides and four
parties in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, namely
Japan and the US on one side and China and Taiwan on
the other. Among the four parties, Japan, China, and
Taiwan are claimants of the sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands while the US is a deeplyinvolved participant and important factor in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. In addition to the
literature review, our analysis of the selected raw data
results in the following three interrelated aspects as the
conflicting points in the claimant’s claims: (1) the
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; (2) the
change of hands of these islands; and (3) the US role in
the dispute. Below are the provided supporting evidence
and counterevidence of Japan, China, and Taiwan
regarding the above conflicting points, our critical
analysis of the conflicting points and evidence, and our
conclusion of the US role in the dispute.
Evidence and counterevidence regarding the
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands under administrative control,
Japan rejects the existence of any dispute over the
sovereignty of these islands. According to its official
statements of “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over
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guard against Japanese pirates along the southeast coast,
Zheng Ruozeng compiled the Illustrated Compendium
on Maritime Security (Zhouhai Tubian) in 1556 under
the auspices of Hu Songxian, who is the supreme
commander of the southeast coastal defense of the Ming
Court. The Diaoyu Islands were included in the
Compendium (Appendix 3).
Geographically, China posits that the Diaoyu
Islands sit on the edge of the Asian continental shelf and
are separated from the Ryukyu Islands by a deep
underwater trench called the Okinawa Trough
(Appendix 4). China holds that the distance between
Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands is 120 nautical miles,
which is shorter than the 200 nautical miles between the
Diaoyu Islands and Okinawa of Japan. Moreover, the
surrounding waters of the Diaoyu Islands have been
traditionally Chinese fishing grounds (White Paper,
2012, pp. 3-5). In one of the envoy missions, Envoy Xu
Baoguang also recorded in his Records of Messages
from Chong-Shan in 1719: “After sailing 10 geng4, our
ships passed Diaoyu Islands…. After sailing another 6
geng, our ships will arrive at Kume Hill, which is the
southwest boundary between the Ryukyu Kingdom and
China” (Inoue, para. 8). Envoy Xu Baoguang also
described “the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are the same
color as other Chinese territories on Fuzu” (Appendix 5)
(Inoue, para. 9).
By the same token, in its official statement of “The
Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of
Republic of China” (Diaoyutai Islands) by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China, Taiwan claims,
“The Diaoyutai Islands, an island group of Taiwan, are
under the jurisdiction of Yilan County” (Diaoyutai
Islands, para. 1). Historically, it is the Chinese that
discovered and named the Diaoyutai Islands and put it
under the jurisdiction of Yilan County of Taiwan.
Chinese fishermen frequently sought shelter on the
islands and knew that there were no terra nullius between
China and the Ryukyu Kingdom (The Diaoyutai Islands,
para. 6). Geographically and geologically, the Diaoyutai
Islands share the same monsoon zone with Taiwan, thus
making it favorable for sail from Taiwan to the islands
than from the Ryukyu Islands. Geologically, the
Okinawa Trough separates the Diaoyutai Islands and the
Ryukyu Islands, making them reside on different
tectonic plates in the East China Sea (The Diaoyutai
Islands, para. 2-5). Thus, to the Chinese in China and
Taiwan, these historical records demonstrate that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Chiwei Island belong to
China and Kume Island belongs to Ryukyu. The
dividing line between China and Ryukyu is Hei Shui
Gou, which is today’s Okinawa Trough between Chiwei
Island and Kume Island. However, it is “an established
principle in international law that neither discovery nor
use by itself is sufficient to establish sovereignty over
land territory” (Su, 2005, p. 49).
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Evidence and counterevidence regarding the
change of hands of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The
Japanese government held that the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands were not part of “the Island of Formosa together
with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said
Island of Formosa,” (Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895, (b) of
Article 2), which were ceded to Japan in May 1985 at the
end of the First Sino-Japanese War (Fact Sheet of MOFA,
2012, para. 11). Whether the Senkaku Islands were
included in the islands of the above treaty article, “there
was no mutual recognition between the two countries”
(About the Senkaku Islands of MOFA, 2013, p. 11).
Furthermore, Under the San Francisco Peace
Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced Taiwan but maintained
territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
(The Basic View, 2013, para. 2). The San Francisco
Peace Treaty stipulates the US “as the sole
administering authority” over “Nansei Shoto south of 29
degree north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and
the Daito Islands)” (1951, Article 3). The Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands were reverted to Japan
with “all and any powers of administration, legislation,
and jurisdiction” under Article 2 of the Agreement
between Japan and the United States of America
Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands of
1971 (also known as the Okinawa Reversion
Agreement). The Senkaku Islands were included in this
agreement as can seen in Appendix 6.
The Japanese government also pointed out that
neither China nor Taiwan made any objections to the
stipulations in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971 (About
the Senkaku Islands of MOFA, 2013, p. 7). Instead,
both China and Taiwan actually recognized the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. For
example, it was mentioned in a letter of appreciation
from a Chinese consul in Nagasaki in 1919 that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were within the “Yaeyama
District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan”
(Appendix 7). For another example, an article in the
People’s Daily dated January 8, 1953 reported that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are one of the seven island
groups belonging to the Ryukyu Islands (Appendix 8).
Finally, the Republic of China New Atlas published in
1933 (Appendix 9) and World Atlas published in 1958
(Appendix 10) identified the Senkaku Islands as part of
Japan (Fact Sheet of MOFA, 2012, para. 13).
In response, the Chinese government argued that
the Diaoyu Islands were grabbed from China by Japan
in the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894-1895 (White
Paper, 2012, pp. 5-8). Early in 1884, a Japanese
businessman by the name of Tatsushiro Koga applied to
lease the Diaoyu Islands, but both the Okinawa
Prefecture Government and the Home Ministry in
Tokyo turned down his applications because “it was not
clear at that time whether the islands belonged to the
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Japanese empire” (White Paper, 2012, p. 5).
Nevertheless, in response to a report of the Magistrate
of Okinawa, the Japanese National Home Secretary
wrote on Sept. 22, 1885: “In regard to the matter of
placing national markers and developing the islands, it
should await a more appropriate time” (MOFA of Japan,
1950). The appropriate time came when China was
defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War and had to sign
the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1985. In the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was made to “cede to
Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty… the island of
Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or
belonging to the said island of Formosa” (Treaty of
Shimonoseki, 1895, (b) of Article 2).
Legally, China argues that the Diaoyu Islands
were returned to China after World War II. However,
it is the US that had made backroom deals with Japan
by arbitrarily including the Diaoyu Islands under the
US trusteeship in the 1950s and returned the power of
administration over the islands to Japan in the 1970s
(White Paper, 2012, pp. 7-9). On Sept. 2, 1045, Japan
solemnly “undertakes for the Emperor, the Japanese
Government and their successors to carry out the
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith”
(First Instrument of Surrender, 1945, para. 6), which
stipulates that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited
to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku
and such minor islands as we determine” (Potsdam
Declaration, 1945, (8), (b), Annex II). Nonetheless,
when Taiwan and its appertaining islands were
returned to the Republic of China in 1945, Japan did
not give back the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands, whose
name had been changed to Senkaku Islands since 1900.
Thus, the Chinese were left “unaware that the
uninhabited ‘Senkaku Islands’ were in fact the former
Diaoyu Islands (Shaw, 2012, para. 15). To make
matters more complicated, the US extended the
Ryukyu to include the Diaoyu Islands during its
administration from 1953 to 1971 and returned
Ryukyu Islands including the Diaoyu Islands to Japan
under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971, which
was signed without the presence and agreement of
China (White Paper, 2012, pp. 2, 5 & 7). All this not
only supports the Chinese arguments but also explains
the belated protests from the Chinese people in China
and Taiwan over Japan’s theft of Chinese territory,
Chinese maps incorrectly identifying the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory, and the US
manipulation of its hegemonic power.
From the perspective of the government of Taiwan,
Japan annexed the Daioyutai Islands as a direct
consequence of the first Sino-Japanese War and never
made any public announcement in order to avoid
arousing China’s objection. The islands should have
been returned to Taiwan after World War II (The
Diaoyutai Islands, para. 16-17), but the US gave the
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Diaoyutai and Ryukyu Islands to Japan against the
strong will of the Chinese. According to declassified
documents of the Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS), the embassy of Republic of China (ROC) sent
a note to the US State Department on March 15, 1971,
making clear that “the U.S. is requested to respect the
ROC’s sovereign rights over the Senkaku Islets and
restore them to the ROC” (FRUS, Vol. XVII, China,
1969-1976, Document 115, para. 7). Although
Kissinger’s hand-written comment “but that is nonsense
since it gives islands to Japan. How can we get a more
neutral position?” (FRUS, Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1976,
Document 115, footnote 3) on the US position of the
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, the US finally did
implement such a nonsensical policy till this very day.
The US role in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute. Although the US is not a claimant, it is still
necessary to demonstrate the US position in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute due to its alliance with
Japan and its deep involvement. The US began
administrating the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from 1953
and returned them to Japanese administration in 1971.
According to Fravel (2010), since World War II, the US
“has been a direct participant in the dispute over the
Senkaku Islands” (p. 147). The US policy towards the
Senkaku territorial dispute is based on: “(1) neutrality in
terms of the ultimate sovereignty of contested areas and
(2) peaceful resolution without resort to coercion or
armed force” (p. 147). In other words, “the United States
took a neutral position with regard to the competing
claims of Japan, China, and Taiwan, despite the return of
the islets to Japanese administration” (Manyin, 2013, p.
4). Upon stepping down as the Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton reiterated the US neutral position over the
sovereignty of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. She further
stated: “We oppose any unilateral actions that would seek
to undermine Japanese administration and we urge all
parties to take steps to prevent incidents and manage
disagreements through peaceful means” (Quinn, 2013,
para. 5-6). Furthermore, the US Senate unanimously
approved an amendment to the 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act, announcing: “While the United States
takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the
Senkaku Islands, the United States acknowledges the
administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands”
(Johnston, 2012, para. 2). Clearly, the US stance in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is officially neutral but
actually pro-Japan.
Just as Blanchard (2000) noted, “the historical
record clearly shows that the United States favored in
both word and deed Japanese claims to the islands” (p.
97). On January 19, 1946, the commander of the
Okinawa Naval Base was instructed to “extend Military
Government operations so as to include the Northern
Ryukyus south of the 30th parallel north and to include
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Sakishima Gunto, [which includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands included]” (p. 103). On August 6, 1948, a report
from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
emphasized, “if the Communists won control of China,
the return of the Ryukyus to China would give the
Soviet Union access to these islands and thereby
endanger the entire US Pacific base system as well as
Japan” (p. 105). In January 1951, the Prime Minister of
Japan sent a message to the US State Department,
agreeing to “give the US all required military rights
there” for “transferring title to the Ryukyus and Bonins”
(p. 107). As a result, former US Secretary of State
Dulles claimed that Japan had “residual sovereignty” in
the Ryukyu Islands, which means: “The United States
will not transfer its sovereign powers [administrative,
legislative, and jurisdiction] over the Ryukyu Islands to
any nation other than Japan” (p. 109). Therefore, it is
questionable for the US, which has been so deeply
involved in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, to
“insist on remaining on the sidelines” (p. 120).
This is why China responded by saying, “the United
States and Japan conducted backroom deals concerning
the ‘power of administration’ over the Diaoyu Dao”
(White Paper. China, 2012, p. 8). Harner (2011) seconded
in his blog article, “it was the US acquiescence in (if not
encouragement of) the Noda government’s decision to
nationalize the disputed islands … that enabled this
crisis” (para. 5). There is also supporting voice in the
media, “indeed, the ambiguity of maintaining US
neutrality on sovereignty yet giving Japan administrative
power over the islands, backed by a mutual defense treaty,
has emboldened Tokyo to nationalize the islands”
(Cheong, 2012, para. 2).
Discussion
As mentioned before, territorial conflict is next to
none in its frequency, severity, and consequences
among all kinds of conflict. To guard against potential
territorial conflict and strive for mutually beneficial
resolutions, the theory of border institutions has been
proposed, which refers to “sets of rules, compliance
procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms
designed to constrain behavior” (Simmons, 2005, p.
827). In the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute,
unwritten rules, compliance procedures, and ethical
norms did exist since China’s Ming Dynasty in the 14 th
century till 1885. Thus, the Chinese envoys could use
the islands as navigation aids during many mission
voyages to the Ryukyu Kingdom, and the ocean areas
around the islands could remain peaceful for so long.
There were also common understandings and restrained
behaviors on all sides of Japan, China, and Taiwan even
after Japan secretly annexed the islands to its territory in
1885 and changed the name of the islands from Diaoyu to
Senkaku. For instance, the Japanese government has done
a good job for many years to keep not only foreigners but
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also its own nationals from approaching and developing
the islands. It is when such status quo was violated that
waves of dispute and conflict arose consequently.
In our theoretical framework, both positive and
negative prospective scenarios have also been depicted
with or without border institutions. As Giordano,
Giordano, and Wolf (2005) noted, the most likely
locations for territorial conflicts are “those in which (1)
institutional development is hindered; (2) previously
functioning institutions collapse; or (3) change in
resource conditions outpace the ability for institutional
adaptation” (p. 48). With regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands dispute, all these three conditions were met.
Change in resource conditions resulted in the hindrance
to and collapse of existing institutions. For example, the
Japanese government declared that it was in the 1970s
that China and Taiwan began arguing for the
sovereignty over the islands only after the United
Nations’ report of potential oil and gas reserves of
200,000 square kilometers in the East China Sea in 1968
(About the Senkaku Islands, 2013, p. 7). Taiwan was
even caught to have changed the terminology of the
“Senkaku Group of Islands” to “Diaoyutai Islets” in its
middle school geography textbook (Appendix 11).
The Japanese government also insisted that there
was no agreement to shelve the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
issue when Japan and China normalized their diplomatic
relations in 1972 and when they were negotiating for the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. Former
Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara officially confirmed
that at the Japan-China summit meeting on Sept. 27,
1972, “they [the Chinese] did not mention the words
‘shelving the issue,’ therefore; it cannot be judged that
there existed any agreement of ‘shelving the issue’ from
the meeting.” Maehara continued that, at the JapanChina summit meeting on Oct. 25, 1978, “‘shelving the
issue’ was the remark made by Mr. Deng Xiaoping
unilaterally” (About the Senkaku, 2013, pp. 9-10).
However, the Chinese government remarked that the
Japanese Government, besides changing the name of
Diaoyu to Senkaku to mislead the Chinese people, is also
attempting to “write off with one stroke the consensus
between the two nations” (Statement, 2012, para. 6).
According to the Statement of China, the leaders of the
two countries, during their summit meetings in 1972 and
1978 “reached important understanding and common
ground on ‘leaving the issue of the Diaoyu Island to be
resolved later’” (para, 6). This consensus “opened the
door to normalization of China-Japan relations and was
followed by tremendous progress in China-Japan
relations and stability and tranquility in East Asia in the
following 40 years” (para. 6).
It is even recorded in “About the Senkaku Islands”
by MOFA of Japan, “Vice Premier Deng: ‘We refer to
the Senkaku Islands as the Diaoyu…. At this time of
negotiations on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we
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agreed to leave the issue aside in much the same way’”
(p. 9). Deng’s remark of “we agreed to leave the issue
aside” is written in black and white, but MOFA of Japan
still denies there is no agreement to shelve the Senkaku
issue. Professor Susumu of Yokohama City University
further clarified, the exchange of Japanese apology in
all sincerity and shelving of the Senkaku issue between
former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakue and Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai were “removed in the MOFAprepared transcripts,” which became “the source of
mistrust between China and Japan” (Harner, 2012, pp.
1-2).
When we reread Giordano, Giordano, and Wolfa’s
(2005) four critical factors for long-term institutional
success, which include: (1) clear language concerning
resource allocation and quality control; (2) high degree of
institutional adaptability; (3) allocating benefits
considered more productive than allocating the resource;
and (4) clearly defined conflict resolution mechanism in
place (pp. 58-59), we cannot but emphasize President Ma
Yingjeou’s peace initiative over the Senkaku/Diaoyu,
which proposed that “all parties concerned hold
conflicting standpoints, and that this is the cause of the
long-standing disputes and the recent rise of tensions in
the region” (East China Sea Peace Initiative by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China,
para. 4). In line with the critical factors for and as the first
step towards long-term institutional success, Taiwan calls
on all the involved parties to “resolve disputes peacefully
based on the UN Charter and relevant provisions in
international law” (para. 5).

Japan as well as international conference declarations
and the instrument of Japanese surrender. It is really
hard to provide a universally accepted warrant as to
which side the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands belongs. Each
side has vulnerable points in its claims. It appears that
Japan is legally stronger in its evidence, but such legal
evidence has been overshadowed by its secretive
annexation of the islands without public notice and
backroom deals with the US. Both China and Taiwan
have provided rich historical, geographical, and ethical
evidence; however, more legal evidence may be
required for international law court resolution.
As the answer to RQ3, we found that what is
lacking in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is threefold: First,
among the claimants, each claimant may need to study
its own claims in relation to the mingled history and the
positive future prospects. To avoid the worst in history
from repeating itself and maintain stability and
prosperity in bi-lateral or tri-lateral relations, Japan,
China, and Taiwan ought to seek consensus again by
calming down and sitting down for open dialogues and
better understanding.
Second, since it has been so deeply involved in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and anxious to “play a
larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its
future” (Obama, 2011, para. 16), the US should play a
more active, more responsible, and more impartial role.
In other words, the US is expected to take the lead to
establishing and maintaining international rules and
norms, not just US core principles, and nurture
mutually-beneficial partners with all claimants instead
of just its allies. Just as Campbell, a renowned US
diplomat for Asian affairs, stressed in an interview: “So
we’re going to push hard for more diplomacy, more
dialogue, and more caution, in both Beijing and Tokyo”
(Kato, 2013, p. 6).
Last but not least, all the three claimants are
advised to seek commonalities by putting aside
differences and begin working out constructive border
institutions. As mentioned before, border institutions
can maintain peace between neighboring countries;
whereas, catastrophic consequences may occur as a
result of increasing conflicts when the existing
institutions collapsed. In other words, territorial disputes
may lead to military confrontations, but wise leadership
guided by domestic needs and international norms may
set the interactions between or among claimants and
bilateral or trilateral relationships onto peaceful paths.
Hopefully, by recognizing and appreciating the existing
border institutions in the form of customary practices
since the 14th century, all the three claimants, possibly
under the influence or leadership of the US, start
working together towards acceptable and legal resource
conventions and treaties in the East China Sea today and
South China Sea tomorrow.

Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to explore the
interactions between the two sides and among the four
parties over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with
the intention to find out what is lacking in their
communication for a genuinely peaceful and mutually
beneficial solution to the multilateral international
conflict. To this end, we raised three research questions
and searched for the answers under the theoretical
guidance of border institutions and the research methods
of hermeneutics.
We found that, as the answer to RQ1, the three
conflicting points in the claimants’ claims are: (1) the
ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; (2) the
change of hands of these islands; and (3) the US role in
the dispute. As the answer to the RQ2, we found that in
terms of the ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
Japan provided evidence that the islands were terra
nullius after repeated survey when it annexed them with
a Cabinet Decision in 1895. In response, both China and
Taiwan supplied geographical and geological evidence,
historical envoy mission records, maritime defense
system, and letters between high-ranking officials of
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